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China’s Legal Soul: The Modern Chinese Legal Identity in Historical 
Context, John W. Head, [Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2009, 234+xxviii pp, paperback, HK$248, US$32] ISBN 1594606366
This is an ambitious book covering the whole of the Chinese legal history 
from the formational days of Confucianism to contemporary Chinese legal 
debate. The objective of the book is not to conduct a survey of Chinese 
legal history in broad strokes – it is more ambitious than that. The author 
uses history as a tool to uncover the ethos, spirit, or soul of Chinese law, 
which is vaguely defined as “the set of fundamental and animating legal 
principles or values that give a society, particularly the legal system of that 
society, its unique spirit and character” (p xiv). This is an unconventional 
book in its alternative style to traditional academic publication. The book 
has many direct quotations, which could be regarded as excessive, and 
many tables, which provide useful and concise timeline of Chinese legal de-
velopment. This is also an interesting, and very readable, book written by a 
serious scholar who is keen to ask fundamental and provocative questions.
The soul of traditional Chinese law is, not surprisingly, Confucianism as 
taught by Confucius himself and as interpreted / distorted by his disciples. 
The essence of the Confucian teaching, according to the author, is that 
“people can be educated; a king should therefore rule by virtue, setting a 
moral example by his behaviour; and that such behaviour should rest on (li)”. 
Compared with li, law was relegated to a minor role in governance, and “the 
cohesion and well-being of society are to be secured not through legal rules 
but through the observance of proper rituals of li” (p 14). Most importantly, 
Confucius extended the application of li from politics and governance to 
the general social relations and assigned li a predominant role in the con-
duct of government (p 13).
The egalitarian Confucian teaching was interpreted and reinterpreted 
by his disciples to become more hierarchical, rigid and punitive, morphing 
into a more institutionalised Neo-Confucianism and a sort of state religion. 
The most significant aspect of the institutionalisation was perhaps the ex-
amination system for the imperial bureaucracy in which bureaucrats were 
recruited according to their ability to understand Confucian doctrines. 
Because of the examination system, according to the author, Confucianism 
“anchored itself more and more deeply into the system of governance…” 
(p 65).
Confucianisation of law took place at two levels. The first is at the leg-
islative level, representing a top-down process in which core Confucian 
doctrines were incorporated into law which would subsequently be applied 
by the magistrates and enforced by harsh punishment. This “imperial Con-
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fucianism”, according to the author, provided legitimacy to the hierarchical 
order in dynasties and proved a resilient and durable state ideology. 
At a more societal level, “people’s Confucianism”, if I may use this term 
to refer to the Confucian doctrines understood, followed and practiced 
by the ordinary people in their daily life, created a version of Confucian 
doctrine which may or may not be consistent with imperial Confucianism. 
Given the penal nature of the dynasty codes, their reach into civil society 
was inherently limited and what shaped people’s behavior were not the cod-
ified legal rules but traditional practice of the ordinary people and the self-
regulation of civil society organisations. This bottom up approach was not 
to deny the influence of Confucianism on Chinese law, but to reaffirm the 
internalisation and socialisation of the Confucian ethos. What appeared as 
a spontaneous social order was actually “heavily influenced by Confucianist 
values that had matured and infiltrated Chinese culture” (p 43). 
Having characterising traditional law in some detail, the author dis-
misses its relevance to contemporary Chinese law. While Confucianism has 
witnessed a return and even becomes fashionable in certain circles, its influ-
ence is largely limited to an ivory tower discussion and has had little impact 
on legislation or legal practice on the ground. As concluded by the author, 
Confucianism “lacks both the theoretical heft and the popular acceptance 
today” that would allow it to reshape the development of Chinese law (p 
178). So Chinese law is no longer traditional and can probably never be 
traditional again after the turmoil in the past one hundred years since the 
end of the dynastic era in China. 
What the author is referring to is, of course, the Imperial Confucian-
ism. Without state sponsorship (it is unlikely for the current Party-state to 
sponsor Confucianism), Confucianism is unlikely to be highly relevant to 
contemporary legislative and judicial development. What requires further 
study is the fate of people’s Confucianism at a more societal level and its 
potential in shaping the legal culture of ordinary people, and in turn the 
impact of popular legal culture on the legal system. 
Then what is the soul of contemporary Chinese law given the inability 
of Confucianism to pose any impact on legislative and judicial arenas? The 
author identifies a few alternative sources but dismisses them quickly, forc-
ing himself to accede, with some reluctance, that contemporary Chinese 
law is extremely fragile, if not soulless, despite his effort to develop a hotch-
potch of a Chinese legal soul. 
The author, for example, turns to the rule of law and constitutional-
ism to locate the soul of Chinese law. China has made certain genuine 
efforts to develop a thin version of the rule of law and achieved visible 
progresses. But after a thorough survey of the rule of law debate in China 
and elsewhere, the author is only cautiously optimistic about the possibility 
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of developing a thin rule of law in China (in the sense that China’s legal 
system does not fall fatally short of meeting its standard) (p 146). As to the 
future for a thick version of the rule of law and constitutionalism in China 
that are grounded in a liberal tradition, he believes that they are “entirely 
up in the air” (p 188). 
An alternative source for locating the Chinese legal soul is authoritari-
anism, or what the author refers to as the Party Line. However, the author 
asserts that the political ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has 
marginalised law to such a degree that it can never be hospitable to legal 
development. In addition, the Party Line is insufficient to be the source 
because socialism is such a hollow concept in China that it cannot sustain 
any legal development. Finally, the Party Line is internally inconsistent and 
it may not be possible to make much sense out of it after the drastic politi-
cal changes over the decades. 
Whether current Chinese law has a soul largely depends on what a soul 
is to be defined; without a clear definition, there is no clear benchmark for 
measurement. But it seems that legal characteristics that the author dis-
cussed and dismissed may at least have good potentials to re-define Chinese 
law and become integral parts of Chinese legal soul. Imperial Confucianism 
has died but people’s Confucianism may still be alive and well, and the bot-
tom up Confucianism as a social practice is more resilient than the state has 
expected. 
The rule of law and constitutionalism, as fragile as they are, also have 
greater potential in China than the author is willing to give credit for. 
There is a broad consensus that the rule of law is indispensable for China’s 
socio-economic development, and it is hard to imagine the rule of law, once 
it is started, will not get thicker over the course of its development. 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is an abused concept but this 
does not necessarily mean that it can never develop certain unique con-
cepts of law. The recent promotion of people-based law and people-friendly 
procedures that are responsive to societal need and greater public good are 
consistent with China’s socialist tradition and part of the Confucian values. 
In this sense, the soul of Chinese law is already there as a mixture of ele-
ments that are embedded in historic and cultural milieu, seriously taking 
into account China’s political reality and borrowing aggressively the best 
practice that have been developed elsewhere. 
Professor Fu Hualing*
* Head, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong.
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